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Type:
Task
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Resolution: Unresolved
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Priority:
High
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Affects Version/s: None
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FLW Mobile App
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All
What this is
Encrypt beneficiaries' personal details in the FLW app's local database, and mask phone and ID numbers on screens, so they cannot be read if a phone is exposed or someone looks over the FLW user's shoulder.
Current behaviour
[TBD/CLARIFICATION REQUIRED] What is encrypted today in the FLW local database and shared preferences, and which fields are shown unmasked, to be confirmed by the FLW team. FLW-1255 shows a shared master key for encrypted preferences is already in use.
Steps
- Encrypt these fields in the local database: name, phone, address, ID numbers, and guardian/witness details.
- Store consent proof files (voice clips, signatures, photos) encrypted on the device until they are uploaded.
- Mask phone and ID numbers on screens. [TBD/CLARIFICATION REQUIRED] Which fields, which screens, and whether the FLW user can reveal the full value.
- Make sure existing data is migrated to the encrypted form without loss. [TBD/CLARIFICATION REQUIRED] Migration approach for existing installs.
Done when
- These fields are stored encrypted in the local database.
- Proof files on the device are encrypted.
- Phone and ID numbers are masked on the agreed screens.
- Existing data survives the update.
Dependencies: AMM-2536 (central encryption). Related to FLW-1255 (Keystore / encrypted-preferences recovery crashes and possible local DB deletion). Do not release before FLW-1255 is understood, as a bad key recovery could delete data.
Source: DPDPA Compliance Proposal v14, sections 2, 5 (Rules), 6. Mirrors AMM-2536 and AMM-2503 (device side).